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Should We Believe?
The Fictional, the Virtual and the Real in the Contemporary Novel
Dr Leigh Wilson
University of Westminster
Abstract: Recent work from both novelists and literary critics has suggested that the 
contemporary novel is sick of fiction and has turned instead to the ‘real’. This article questions 
this understanding of the contemporary novel and, by focusing in particular on the 6-volume 
Min Kamp by Karl Ove Knausgaard, suggests instead that the most important representational 
model for the contemporary novel is the virtual. In establishing this, the article returns to both 
a history of the concept of the virtual and to Coleridge’s ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ in 
order to make visible the role of the virtual as a model for contemporary prose fiction.
Belief, Fiction and Non-existence
After being championed, in much postmodernist theory, as the model for all narrative, the 
fictional, if we listen to an increasing number of writers, can no longer be believed in. In his 
admission of his repeated experience of fiction as surplus to requirement, published in an article 
in the Guardian at the beginning of 2013, Ian McEwan writes that, when his ‘faith in fiction 
falters’, he no longer believes what ‘imaginary Henry said or did to non-existent Sue’, and what 
he wants instead is knowledge of ‘reality’.1 With the time saved by not reading fiction, McEwan 
suggests, he could catch up on some case law which has the benefit of being about, in his words, 
‘Real events!’2 In Reality Hunger: A Manifesto (2010), David Shields, ‘bored by out-and-out 
fabrication’, has ceased to believe in fiction too. The fiction writer’s burden is one of ‘unreality, 
the nasty fact that none of this ever really happened’. Unlike McEwan, what Shields wants 
instead is not to be told the ‘truth’ about ‘real events’, but for fictional writing to itself consist of 
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‘reality’. The writing he finds most exciting and persuasive is by writers who, rather than making 
it up, are, in his words, ‘breaking larger and larger chunks of “reality” into their work’.3
This articulation of the rejection of the fictional because of a failure of belief in its 
burdensome ‘unreality’ can be found too in the six volumes of Min Kamp (My Struggle), by 
the Norwegian writer Karl Ove Knausgaard (2009-2011; English translation 2013-2016; 
volume 6 has not yet been published in English). The volumes consist of a non-chronological 
account of Knausgaard’s life from infancy to, in the last volume, the effects on him of the 
publication of the earlier ones. In some of the volumes this account is interspersed with 
essayistic writing on, for example, death, ageing, politics, art and music. Many reviewers of 
Min Kamp have compared Knausgaard to Proust because of the work’s combination of 
novelistic form and autobiographical content. In the second volume (published as A Man in 
Love in the UK) (2009/2013), Knausgaard accounts for this formal hybridity. He describes the 
moment in 2006 or 2007 when he realized that, after having written two critically successful 
novels, Ute av verden (1998) (Out of the World) and En tid for alt (2004) (the English 
translation was published as A Time To Every Purpose Under Heaven in the UK in 2008 and 
as A Time for Everything in the US in 2009), he was sick of fiction: ‘Just the thought of a 
fabricated character in a fabricated plot made me nauseous, I reacted in a physical way. Had 
no idea why. But I did’.4 Later he admits that he can no longer write conventional fiction 
because ‘every single sentence was met with the thought: but you’re just making this up. It has 
no value. Fictional writing has no value….’.5 Volume 4, published as Dancing in the Dark in 
the UK (2015), suggests retrospectively that a sense that writing should, rather than make 
things up, return us to the ‘real’ was already present at the beginning of Knausgaard’s 
experience as a writer, despite his two works of fiction. He claims that as he began to write, 
aged 18, what motivated him was the way writing connected him to the reality of his past. 
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Rather than making things up, his writing at this point instead returned him to the time in 
childhood when ‘the trees were trees, not “trees”, cars not “cars”, when dad was dad, not 
“dad”’.6 The six volumes of Min Kamp purport to be writing which dispenses with fiction’s 
inverted commas and returns to us what Knausgaard calls in volume 1 the ‘there’ of the 
world.7
What is strange about this eschewal of belief in fiction by novelists because of its fabricated 
nature, and strange too about the unquestioning approbation that has dominated responses to it 
from reviewers, readers and critics, is that, according to the critical orthodoxies, no one ever 
asked them to believe in the first place. Once the novel as fiction was established and authors 
no longer needed to protest the truth of their work, the critical orthodoxy became that, as 
Catherine Gallagher has argued, belief did not transfer to the unashamedly fictional but rather 
the fictional established itself as ‘believable stories that did not solicit belief’.8 Rather than 
believe, critic after critic has asserted that what fiction asks readers to do instead, using 
Coleridge’s phrase from the Biographia Literaria (1817), is to ‘willingly suspend disbelief’. 
This demand has been glossed by Gallagher in such a way that, for her, it is clear that disbelief 
crucially remains part of the experience of fiction-reading:
Novels seek to suspend the reader’s disbelief, as an element is suspended in a solution 
that it thoroughly permeates. Disbelief is thus the condition of fictionality, prompting 
judgments, not about the story’s reality, but about its believability, its plausibility.9
Here, disbelief in a story’s reality is a precondition of, or is woven into, its believability. For so 
many contemporary writers, however, believability, rather than being dependent only on 
plausibility, is destroyed precisely by disbelief in a story’s ‘reality’. The condition for belief has 
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become Shields’ ‘chunks’ of reality brought in to narrative through the modes of autofiction, 
essay and memoir. Belief, it would seem, has become dependent on that which is thought to 
really exist.
This taken-for-granted relation of belief to existence is problematic, however, but that it is 
assumed can begin to prompt more probing questions about novelists’ eschewal of belief in 
fiction. Debates about the meaning of belief from at least David Hume have circled around 
exactly the question of this relation. For Hume in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
(1748), what distinguishes belief from fancy is the role in it of ‘matters of fact’, those things 
outside of the mind which perceives:
It follows, therefore, that the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or 
feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the 
will, nor can be commanded at pleasure. It must be excited by nature, like all other 
sentiments; and must arise from the particular situation, in which the mind is placed at any 
particular juncture. Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses, it 
immediately, by the force of custom, carries the imagination to conceive that object, which 
is usually conjoined to it; and this conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment, 
different from the loose reveries of the fancy. In this consists the whole nature of belief.10 
In his ‘The Will to Believe’, William James moved the idea of a force which enables belief from 
its location in sense impressions, from ‘matters of fact’, to an already existing condition in the 
mind, to what James’ calls ‘relations to the individual thinker’.11 Belief depends upon what 
5
James call a ‘pre-existing tendency’ which is not determined by sense impressions, but by the 
mental whole constituted by a reading of the world based on an imaginative projection precisely 
beyond matters of fact.12 For James, ‘fictions’ do not preclude belief but make it possible and his 
conclusion is to defend ‘the right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to 
tempt our will’.13 What the concept of belief marks then is the meeting of mind and world and 
the fraught debates around the nature of that meeting. That the concept of belief, rather than the 
weaker ‘believability’, has returned to debates about fiction suggests a new configuration of the 
relation between existence and imagination in the contemporary, but a sense of this conflict over 
the definition of belief and the implications of it is as missing from recent literary critical work 
on the contemporary novel as it is from the confessions of novelists. Critics have accounted for 
these problematically shifting relations among reality, belief, believability and plausibility 
almost entirely through the implicit assumption that belief is linked to empirical experience and 
that it is this that has led to contemporary anxiety over the value and status of the novel. In so 
doing, they have asserted the idea of a return to the ‘real’ that accepts the claims of apostate 
novelists. Peter Boxall, for example, has argued in his Twenty-First-Century Fiction (2013) that 
what he sees as the two dominant fascinations of the contemporary novel – temporality and the 
body – are entwined with its attempt to ‘grasp the texture of the contemporary real’.14 Moreover, 
in his The Value of the Novel (2015), Boxall sees the pressure put on the novel by the ‘real’ as 
insistently about physical existence. He notes, using Steven Connor’s phrase, the ‘thingly turn’ at 
around the turn of the century, the supposed coming to an end of ‘the docility of things’.15 Pieter 
Vermeulen too, in his Contemporary Literature and the End of the Novel (2015), argues that the 
contemporary novel is thinned and culturally disempowered, is in its ‘afterlife’, in part because it 
can no longer compete with the pressure of the real.16 Unusually, though, he does go beyond the 
binary of the fictional and the real in suggestive ways, but in ways that in fact point beyond his 
claims. In writing of Dana Spiotta’s Eat the Document (2006), he suggests that its conception of 
6
the novel form reveals an ‘analog agency’ which makes possible an engagement between fiction 
and the ‘real’ of the material world. Spiotta’s novel, he argues, ‘leans on the capacity of 
phonographs and tape recorders to function as unselective inscription devices, which 
indiscriminately record intentional as well as unintentional acoustic events’.17 Analog technology 
can therefore ‘capture those moments that cannot pass through’, using Friedrich Kittler’s phrase, 
‘the bottleneck of the signifier’.18 For Vermeulen, the claim for ‘analog agency’ is evidence of 
the contemporary novel’s negotiation of the limits of the fictional and its desire for ‘reality’.19 
His reading of Eat The Document shows that the novel clearly thematises the analog as 
maintaining a ‘desire for reality’ – through a character in the novel’s present in the late 1990s 
who listens over and over to analog bootleg recordings of the Beach Boys and through others 
associated with a Seattle bookshop who search out and privilege obsolete technological formats 
– but the novel is also full of digital technology. Characters rip music onto their laptops, send 
emails, hack internet sites and talk in chatrooms. The novel demonstrates thematically that the 
desire for the analog is enmeshed with the lived experience of the digital but implicitly too it 
suggests that it is the virtual, not the analog, that acts as a model for its forms of representation. 
Late in the novel a character Josh claims that ‘[i]ncreasingly the world will imitate the Internet in 
how it processes information’. What he means by this is that, on the internet, ‘one thing leads to 
another in this non-linear, associative way’ and it is formally, rather than through the ‘analog 
agency’ of its thematic attention, that Eat the Document reproduces this in its non-linear 
chronology and use of multiple focalisers and narrative positions.20 Unlike the writers whose 
faith in the fictional is faltering and the critics who agree with them, then, Vermeulen’s work 
acknowledges the use of a mediator between the fictional and the hungered-for real, but locates it 
in Spiotta’s thematic use of the analog, whereas in fact behind this, or rather supporting it 
structurally, is the virtual.
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This article will argue that it is the imitation of the virtual, rather than either ‘chunks of “reality”’ 
or ‘analog agency’, that currently forms the representational basis of many contemporary novels 
and the legitimacy of their requests for belief. Through an investigation of the history of the idea 
of the virtual, it will show that this model has produced both the apparent desire for the real 
noted by so many critics and the eschewal of belief in the fictional confessed by so many writers. 
If Knausgaard’s Min Kamp is the lengthiest articulation of the loss of faith in the fictional, it is 
no surprise that in it can be found too one of the clearest imitations of the virtual. This article 
will show that, by in the end reversing Coleridge’s understanding of the relation between 
existence, the fictional, disbelief and belief, the volumes of Min Kamp demonstrate the effects of 
the model of the virtual on the possibilities of contemporary prose fiction.
The Virtual: Between Non-existence and Existence
The attempt at mimicking the virtual in the contemporary novel in order to secure belief has 
been misread as a striving for ‘reality’ or ‘analog agency’ because of a shift in the dominant 
meaning of the virtual over the last few decades. Early uses of the term denoted that which is 
outside of the category of physical existence. For Aristotle, across the Physics, Metaphysics, 
Nicomachean Ethics and De Anima, ‘dynamis’ was equivalent to an entity’s potentiality, its 
not-yet existence, and it was this meaning that dominated medieval accounts following 
Thomas Acquinas’ translation of Aristotle’s ‘dynamis’ as ‘virtualis’. In the eighteenth century, 
the dominant use of the term changed. In Kant’s ‘The Form and Principles of the Sensible and 
the Intelligible’ (1770), originally written in Latin, ‘virtualis’ is used to denote something 
which exists in one order, but can only be actualized in another, rather than denoting a 
difference within the same order, as in Aristotle. Kant’s use though retains the sense of a cause 
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outside the physically existent: ‘the cause of the world is a being which exists outside the 
world, and thus it is not the soul of the world; its presence in the world is not local but 
virtual’.21
In the nineteenth century, significant uses of the term are found in attempts to think, not about 
causes which transcend space and time, but about that within the existing world which 
troubles a strictly materialist understanding of the relations of cause and effect. Here the 
virtual denotes neither Aristotle’s conception of a potential anterior to the physical and 
actualized within it, nor Kant’s sense of the virtual as that outside the limitations of time and 
space and of a different order to it, but rather an attempt to conceive of an existence in the 
same order but radically different from either an understanding of the physical focused on the 
existence of discrete, material objects or from an idealist conception of the single order of 
ideas and things. Uses of the virtual from the nineteenth century on tend to do this in one of 
two ways, and these two have intertwined and alternated in dominance since. In the first the 
virtual challenges the laws of physical existence, and in the second it mimics them. In the 
work of C.S. Peirce both of these can be seen. In an essay from 1868, ‘Some Consequences of 
Four Incapacities’, first published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Peirce set out the 
virtual nature of thought in a way that challenges orthodox conceptions of physical laws. 
Thought is virtual because it enacts an undoing of linear understandings of cause and effect; 
subsequent thoughts are the causes of previous ones rather than their effects: 
no present actual thought (which is a mere feeling) has any meaning, any intellectual 
value; for this lies not in what is actually thought, but in what this thought may be 
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connected with in representation by subsequent thoughts; so that the meaning of a 
thought is altogether something virtual.22
The virtual for Peirce is the ‘real effective force’ behind consciousness, which consists of, but 
is greater than, the sum total of the ‘continuous stream’ of the ‘inexplicable’ facts of single 
thoughts.23 For Peirce here the virtual is neither the potential pre-existing actualization in the 
existent, nor is it that which exists outside space and time, but nevertheless it is still that which 
marks a conceptual space beyond the assumed nature and laws of physical existence.
This form of the virtual is fundamental to the thinking of Henri Bergson in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. In Matter and Memory (1896), the term – virtuelle – is used to 
mark that which belongs not to matter but to subjectivity; what is virtual is existence that is 
‘proper to things of the spirit’.24 This understanding of the virtual also attains to those things 
usually thought material and unproblematically existent, however, such as bodies, as Bergson 
argues that the conception of individual bodies in the world necessarily miscomprehends the 
‘ultimate elements of matter’, which is continuity, not the discontinuity perceived through our 
senses.25 Acts of perceptions are for Bergson then inherently virtual in that they mis-see the 
physical world but make possible conscious existence within it. Perception is ‘virtual 
action’.26 This means that in the images of perception, ‘[t]here is nothing positive here, 
nothing added to the image, nothing new. The objects merely abandon something of their real 
action in order to manifest their virtual action’.27 However, in Bergson’s discussion of 
memory, the virtual is not much a marker of what is lost as it describes what Keith Ansell-
Pearson has called in the context of the virtual ‘the disruptive and creative power’ of 
memory.28 What makes both perception and memory virtual for Bergson though is that they 
challenge, as do Peirce’s ‘thoughts’, the universality of physical laws as the limit of the 
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existent. This sense of the virtual has a clear relation to the ‘fictions’ so important to the act of 
belief for James, and indeed to fiction itself as second order representation.
The second version of the virtual is also found in Peirce. In his influential entry for ‘virtual’ 
for the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology in 1902, Peirce’s definition is based on the 
idea that ‘virtual’ is a synonym for ‘almost’ and as such begins to open up the possibility that 
the virtual is analogous to, rather than distinct from or a challenge to, assumptions about 
physical existence. Here, the virtual is something that denotes the same effects as those of its 
comparable term without the same causes. Peirce gave his authorized definition of the term as 
follows: ‘A virtual X (where X is a common noun) is something, not an X, which has the 
efficiency (virtus) of an X’.29 He explains in his dictionary entry that his ‘efficiency’ is the true 
meaning of virtual, but that it is often confounded with ‘potential’, which is for him ‘almost its 
contrary’.30 Peirce’s example clarifies this: ‘A virtual velocity is something not a velocity, but 
a displacement; but equivalent to a velocity in the formula “what is gained in velocity is lost in 
power”’.31 The virtual here begins its shifts in meaning, from potentiality to non-material 
causes to physical effects which appear as if they have causes in the physical characteristics of 
the world. 
A tension between these conceptions of the virtual can be seen clearly around the turn of the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries as the everyday uses of digital technologies increased. 
What can be traced is the increasing dominance of the use of the virtual to denote that which 
mimics the physical world, and it is this that is the context for the eschewal of belief in the 
fictional among novelists. The term ‘virtual’ had been used through the 1980s and 1990s in 
poststructuralist theories in a variety of ways which articulated a sense of the power and 
agency of those things conventionally seen as beyond the existing and the real, often drawing 
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on the work of Bergson, but late in the 1990s this use came under pressure. In 1999, Mark 
Poster argued that this use of the term was ‘metaphorical’ and should be resisted. He claimed 
that the term should be rooted in current technological materialities, that the ‘material basis of 
the term, the machinic assemblages of cyberspace and helmet-glove apparatuses’ should be 
kept in mind.32 Poster rejects here the theoretical uses of the term which make it a synonym 
for the fictional. He particularly targets what he calls ‘literary theorists’ – he cites Derrida and 
Baudrillard -- who use the virtual to colonise both reality and the technological for their own 
interests. 
Hence for these literary interpreters, virtual reality is not a new technology that has 
general cultural significance that would put reality into question. Here reality is ‘always 
already’ virtual, while the helmet-glove technology is a mere machine. In the hands of 
certain literary theorists the virtual becomes transcendental and founds the real in its 
own image. Thus novels are just as much virtual realities as computer-generated 
immersive environments. And since novels are more ‘real’ than experience, fiction more 
true than facts, a new disciplinary foundation for Literature is constructed.33
Since Poster’s challenge, it has been within debates around the theory of computer games that 
this injunction to assert the alignment of the virtual with the real and the existent by 
distinguishing it from the fictional has been particularly taken up.34 As Marie-Laure Ryan has 
recently suggested, computer games combine the older helment-and-glove sense of the virtual 
with the more recent sense of everyday ‘applications of digital technology that affect our lives 
much more directly’, but what is key is that both of these are about a certain understanding of 
the existent.35 In considering the representational and ontological status of the worlds created 
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in computer games, theorists of computer games work at precisely the point where the virtual 
has always been situated – negotiating the terms of existence -- but their work makes visible 
the extent to which the virtual as ‘almost’ is now constructed through its opposition to the 
fictional and the supposed non-existent in order to assert its analogy with the ‘real’, the 
existent. Grant Tavinor, in 2012, suggested an origin for the claiming of the virtual for the 
existent asserted by Poster. He claims that the use of the term virtual in relation to information 
technology began in early computing with the idea of ‘virtual computers’ where, 
paradoxically, the material stood in for the abstractions of the electronic. He explains that a 
‘virtual computer’ described what happens when a ‘computational program is carried out in a 
non-electronic medium, typically through pen and paper calculations’.36 If pen and paper are a 
‘virtual computer’, what continues from this formulation into more recent uses of the term in 
the theory of computer games is that the designation of virtual, unlike its use in the Peirce of 
1868, in Bergson, or in poststructuralism, asserts a relation to material existence and as such is 
the opposite of the fictional.
An article by Espen Aarseth, given in 2005 as a conference paper at the 6th Digital Arts and 
Culture Conference and published in Intermédialités in 2007, seems to have begun the most 
recent debate in the theory of computer games on the relation between the fictional and the 
virtual. In the article, Aarseth contests the use of the term ‘fiction’ to describe the characters, 
events and objects represented in computer games. As he states explicitly, Aarseth is content 
to use very basic definitions of both fiction and reality in his delimiting exercise, but on the 
basis of them he goes on to claim that, while they may contain elements of fiction, games also 
contain content that is ‘ontologically different’ from the fictional.37 What is crucial about 
Aarseth’s argument is that the distinction between the virtual and the fictional for him is about 
the extent to which second-order creations can be experienced through the senses and can be 
13
interacted with in some physical way. Aarseth claims, in establishing this, that the labyrinth in 
Stanley Kubrick’s The Shining (1980) is fictional, whereas a labyrinth in a computer game is 
not ‘since it can be navigated by the same rules as the one at Hampton Court’. While he says 
that, if Kubrick had used the maze at Hampton Court for his labyrinth, rather than constructing 
it from a number of different sources edited together, then it would have been ‘real even if the 
film as such was a fiction’, actually the question of reference as such is not really key in 
Aarseth’s distinction between existence and non-existence, the virtual and the fictional.38 The 
non-existence of Kubrick’s labyrinth is not really a result of its non-existence in the world, but 
rather it is the result of the fact that it cannot be interacted with by the viewer. Aarseth 
concludes from these distinctions that games occupy a place ‘between fiction and our world: 
the virtual’.39
Aarseth’s brief paper struggles with the distinctions that are its focus, in part because of its 
inadequate conceptualization of either the real or the fictional. However, its strongest claim – 
and the claim that has provoked the most response and debate within games theory -- is that 
while the objects of the virtual are not real, the experience of engaging with them is. As 
Aarseth puts it in his chapter in the collection The Novel (2006), playing a computer game is 
more like ‘writing than reading’. Simulated games do not work with the ‘preset orders and 
endings’ of narrative, he says: ‘[t]he emotions and gestures are direct and immediate, 
produced for the moment (and not for the page or the stage)’.40 For Aarseth, then, following 
the Peirce of the dictionary entry, the virtual defines effects which can be conceptualised in 
the same way as those things that unquestionably have physical existence.
 That there is a clear line between existence and non-existence, and that the line places on one 
side the sensual and physical existence and on the other fiction, remains unquestioned 
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throughout the debate in computer games theory, even among writers who contest elements of 
Aarseth’s argument. John Richard Sageng, in his ‘In-Game Action’, goes so far as to question 
the need for the category of the virtual at all, so firm for him is the distinction between what 
he calls representation and action.41 While, for him, the same player actions can be actions 
proper and representations of actions (the player is actually manipulating shapes on the screen 
as well as pretending to shoot enemies with a gun), the distinction between the actual as 
interaction and the represented is still his conceptual bedrock. Rune Klevjer, while disagreeing 
with Sageng’s claim and arguing that computer games do indeed occupy a place between 
reality and fiction (the latter he glosses as ‘stories, novels, films’), still asserts the central 
element of existence in digital technologies, arguing that: ‘the simulation of physical reality in 
computer games, unlike the abstract and concrete models of non-computerised mimetic play, 
is able to constitute its own irreducible ground of perception and action’. He concludes that 
computer technology has produced a ‘truly paradoxical space for interaction and expression, 
in which action and simulated action cannot be separated’ because ‘[t]he digitial computer has 
the unique capacity to turn algorithmic models into objects of tangible interaction’. While the 
games are second-order models, the player of computer games interacts with them as first-
order things, ‘as though they are concrete rather than informational objects and 
environments…. Information is made nature’.42
The strength of this assumption in the theory of computer games can be seen even among 
those who attempt a more nuanced analysis of the fictional. Grant Tavinor has criticized 
Aarseth as having ‘an awful analysis of fiction’ and his final position is that fictionality and 
virtuality overlap rather than standing in opposition to each other.43 Nevertheless, despite his 
disagreements with Aarseth, what they do agree on is the link between fictionality and non-
existence. In response to Aarseth’s claims about mazes, Tavinor argues the maze in Pac Man 
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contains the real, the virtual and the fictional, the latter being the ghosts in the maze, as these 
do not exist.44 
The Return to and of Belief
What the debate about the virtual within the theorization of computer games suggests is that 
the assertion of the importance of any current form of representation circles around its claim 
for existence. This suggests that the recent eschewal of belief in the fictional by novelists, 
when (or perhaps because) such belief has never been demanded, is in fact about a desire for 
belief and despair over the supposed non-existence of the fictional. If it is the existence of the 
virtual that is now key to its definition, it would make sense, then, that this desire for belief 
among novelists is manifested in the mimicking, not of the analog nor of the real, but of the 
virtual. Such a mimicking of the virtual is indeed traceable in Knausgaard’s Min Kamp. In 
considering where the volumes locate a justifiable belief in the existent, and the relation 
between this and their eschewal of belief in the ‘fabricated’ nature of the fictional, a return to 
Coleridge’s ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ is timely. Such a return will finally be suggestive 
in thinking about the possibilities for prose fiction of this use of the virtual as existence as a 
model.
Min Kamp has been extraordinarily successful, critically and commercially. By 2012 the 
volumes had sold over half a million copies in Norway alone, and they have been translated 
into twenty-two languages. Anglophone critics and writers have been almost entirely full of 
praise, in particular for the work’s eschewal of the fictional. Rachel Cusk, writing in the 
Guardian in 2013, called Min Kamp ‘perhaps the most significant literary enterprise of our 
time’ for its making visible the separation between time and narrative and between life and 
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meaning. This, she argued, results in ‘at last, authenticity’.45 Sheila Heti, who has in an 
interview in The Believer admitted her own inability to make things up any more,46 in her 
review of Knausgaard’s second volume in the London Review of Books in 2014 praised him 
for constructing a form of writing which rejects the fakery of fiction in order to represent the 
world in a way she calls ‘really real’.47 Knausgaard’s volumes are indeed dominated by 
straightforward description of events from his past, reproduced with extraordinary attention to 
the minutiae of physical detail and without the principle of selection-as-significance which is 
usually implicit in fiction. In contrast to Vermeulen’s claims about Spiotta’s novel, though, the 
physical in Knausgaard is not recreated through analog inscription, but through the intense 
sensual perception of the author-protagonist. However, in Knausgaard’s work, despite his 
claims, and those of his reviewers, the ‘real’ is not that of the ‘there’ of the world or of the 
‘really real’. It is the ‘real’ of the contemporary virtual. 
In his first volume, recounting a New Year’s eve during his teenage years, Knausgaard 
describes retrieving plastic bags containing beer from their hiding place among some trees. He 
tells us that: ‘The bags were where I had left them, covered with a thin layer of snow which 
slid down the smooth plastic when I picked them up’.48 The detail of the description, against 
readerly expectation, is not a proleptic indication of their future importance. The bags produce 
no plot; they do not appear again. The hyperbolic nature of this description – its intense focus 
on tiny physical detail -- suggests instead an attempt to swerve the question of representation 
entirely, to remain within a fantasy of immediacy, but this is complicated by the description in 
volume 4 already discussed of the 18-year-old Knausgaard’s early attempts at writing. Volume 
4 is an account of the year Knausgaard spent teaching in a school in northern Norway in order 
to allow himself time to write. Towards the end of the volume, Karl Ove is in the classroom, 
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teaching his pupils, and begins to think about the weekend ahead, and how he will spend it 
writing. He has spent his time so far in northern Norway writing short stories and the content 
of these is familiar to readers of volume 3 of Min Kamp, Boyhood Island, which recounts 
Knausgaard’s childhood in Tybakken, on the island of Tromøya, southern Norway:
This weekend I would definitely have to write. No trip to Finnsnes during the day, no 
party in the evening, just sit in front of the computer from the moment I got up to the 
moment I went to bed.
I had five short stories now, apart from the two stories based on dreams. All of them had 
the same protagonist, Gabriel, and the same cast of characters. The action took place in 
Tybakken. What was strange was how close the place was to me. Sitting in front of the 
typewriter was like opening a door to it. The scene rose inside me in its entirety and 
repressed everything around me…. If anyone rang my doorbell now…I would jump out 
of my skin. It didn’t feel as though my childhood surroundings were intruding on the 
present but vice versa: I was really back in my childhood, and it was the present that was 
intruding….49
What follows this is the passage quoted earlier about trees and cars rather than ‘trees’ and 
‘cars’. It is the typewriter which is the door to the past, but it is a door which returns him to the 
objects of the past as if that return were not in writing, as if the typewriter produced those 
objects themselves rather than the words which denote them. Friedrich Kittler, however, 
influentially argued that, in the context of the first technological revolution at the end of the 
nineteenth century, ‘[t]he typewriter cannot conjure up anything imaginary, as can cinema; it 
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cannot simulate the real, as can sound recording’.50 Knausgaard, writing in the midst of the 
digital revolution, looking back to the years just before its beginnings, retrospectively converts 
the only-metaphorical possibilities of the typewriter into the virtual creations of the computer. 
In the English translation which is quoted above, the first paragraph uses the word ‘computer’, 
the second uses the word ‘typewriter’. In the Norwegian edition, the same word – 
‘skrivemaskinen’ (the typewriter) – is used in both paragraphs. In the translation Knausgaard’s 
invisible substitution of computer for typewriter has been made visible.
The desire for the ‘door’ of the typewriter to produce trees and not ‘trees’ is of course a 
nostalgic and romantic desire for the identity of thing and representation. However, while 
undoubtedly Knausgaard’s writing again and again expresses the aim of achieving this identity 
– in volume 5 he yearns not to write about ‘[m]ist, heart, blood, trees’ but to ‘make my writing 
be them’ – it does it through the conception of the virtual we have seen in the work of the 
theorists of computer games.51 The strength of any perception and its effect on the perceiver in 
establishing existence – as in the claims of computer games theorists that the virtual has an 
existence not shared by the fictional – is key throughout the volumes. For him writing is about 
the ‘there’ of the world – ‘There, that is writing’s location and aim’ -- and the ‘there’ that 
Knausgaard most values is dominated by the visual.52 For him, he says in volume 2, A Man in 
Love, ‘the visual always came first’ and is that which connects him most directly to what he 
calls ‘physical, concrete reality’.53 This reconnection with the world is of primary importance 
to Knausgaard and he describes his most significant experiences as being when, often through 
visual art, ‘for a few seconds you catch sight of another world from the one you were in only a 
moment earlier, where the world seems to step forward and show itself for a brief glimpse 
before reverting and leaving everything as before….’.54 The alternative world is in the details 
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of the usually visible world, so transformed that they are not the usual world but yet can be 
perceived and interacted with. The alternative world is the virtual world.
The extent to which this investment in the perception of the detail of the physical world is 
linked to belief and existence is demonstrated in Heti’s review of Knausgaard’s second 
volume. The review begins with her account of meeting Knausgaard while she was reading the 
first volume. She asked him if a scene near the beginning, rendered in much detail, during a 
New Year’s eve when Knausgaard was about 15 and comes across his mother in the kitchen 
scrubbing potatoes, was a ‘real memory…or did you make it up?’ Knausgaard replied: ‘No, 
no, I made it up.’ Heti admits that ‘[a]fter that disappointing and confusing admission, I was 
unable to pick up his books for another year’. Knausgaard’s admission undoes for a while 
Heti’s ability to believe:
His many readers believe that what he’s writing is the truth. But if the scrubbing of the 
potatoes was made up, are the books true, in the way we understand true to be? If they 
don’t have a faithful relationship with ‘what happened’, does it matter? Might they even 
in some ways be better?55
By the end of the review, she has answered her final question in the affirmative. Knausgaard’s 
writing is the ‘realism of the really real’ because its gaze is, not that of ‘the novel’ nor of ‘art’ 
but rather, using Knausgaard’s own words, ‘at the same height as our own gaze’.56 
Knausgaard’s writing then is believable despite being made up because it produces the 
experiential from our own perceiving position. As in recent theorisations of computer games, 
the perception of sensual experience is the experience of the real and the existent, and this is 
more important than whether the potato scene is a real memory or a fiction. Both Heti’s 
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eventual affirmation of Knausgaard’s writerly practice, and Knausgaard’s apparent 
willingness to admit that the ‘memory’ was made up, suggest then that, as in Aarseth, the 
persuasiveness of representation for the reader is not linked to an assumption about its 
referential status, but rather it is the careful rendering of physical detail, such that the scene 
can be ‘seen’, that is at stake. Heti’s ‘really real’ is produced in Knausgaard through a 
‘seeming’, a virtuality which produces the perception of existence while vanishing its use of 
the fictional to do so.
Should We Believe? Returning to Coleridge and the ‘willing suspension of disbelief’
The virtual, then, or virtualised writing, allows belief because it is connected to the physically 
existent. The fictional, in contrast, only allows a ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ which, 
according to Gallagher, describes an evacuation of belief and a replacement of it with 
‘believability’. If Knausgaard remains romantic in his desire for the identity of representation 
and things, his use of the virtual seems to undo Coleridge’s description of the demands of the 
fictional. As I have suggested, the literary critical orthodoxy has long been, based on 
Coleridge’s phrase, that fiction does not demand the operation of belief. However, a return to 
the context of Coleridge’s claim suggests a different way of thinking about belief, the fictional 
and the virtual, and indeed about Knausgaard’s representation of the ‘really real’.
Coleridge’s much repeated phrase comes in the context of his retelling of the genesis of the 
Lyrical Ballads. He and Wordsworth, he says, talked often of the way that pleasure in poetry 
comes from the combination of the representation of the existent – its ‘faithful adherence to 
the truth of nature’ – with the non-existent -- ‘the interest of novelty [given] by the modifying 
colours of imagination’.57 Prompted by this, Coleridge says that he and Wordsworth planned a 
21
collection of poems where one half dealt with supernatural subjects and the other with 
‘ordinary life’.58 It is the former that Coleridge says make necessary ‘the willing suspension of 
disbelief’. The inference is that this suspension, which ‘constitutes poetic faith’,59 is 
unproblematic for those works that present ordinary life, but that the challenge for the writer 
of poems whose subject was the supernatural (and these were to be Coleridge’s) was to 
produce in the reader the same belief that would be unproblematically given to poems on more 
quotidian subjects. However, their aim was not quite this straightforward. For Coleridge goes 
on to say that the challenge for Wordsworth, who was to write the poems on ‘things of every 
day’, was to produce in the reader a reaction to the presentation of the everyday as if what was 
presented was novel and unexpected, the result of the ‘modifying colours of imagination’. 
Wordsworth’s poems of the everyday were to ‘excite a feeling analogous to the supernatural, 
by awakening the mind’s attention from the lethargy of custom’.60 While the Lyrical Ballads 
did not in the end really follow this plan, in setting it out, Coleridge makes clear his aims in 
writing of the supernatural in a way that undermines most subsequent understandings of his 
phrase ‘the willing suspension of disbelief’. He explains that ‘the excellence aimed at’ in 
writing poems on supernatural topics:
was to consist in the interesting of the affections by the dramatic truth of such emotions, 
as would naturally accompany such situations, supposing them real. And real in this 
sense they have been to every human being who, from whatever source of delusion, has 
at any time believed himself under supernatural agency.61
Here, the experiencing of the fictional as real and the consequent ability to believe in it are 
central to Coleridge’s plan and suggests that the ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ does not, as 
Gallagher argues along with many others through the twentieth century, imply the retaining of 
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a skepticism, a disbelief ‘suspended’ in and ‘thoroughly’ permeating the fictional,62 but rather 
it implies that the experience of the reader of fiction is the belief that they are experiencing 
something as existing. In this, Coleridge’s sense of the experience of the made up is much 
closer to that of the conception of the virtual in the theory of computer games. However, 
unlike the idea of the virtual here and in Knausgaard, the perception of something in Coleridge 
is not dependent on its existence as the ‘there’ of the world. What is important about the 
hallucinated nature of a supernatural experience, for Coleridge, is both that it is experienced as 
real and its ‘actual’ status as not real. What produces belief in poetry for Coleridge is the 
reproduction of an experience in ‘real life’ which itself makes ambiguous the boundaries 
between experience and imagination, between the real and the made up. Coleridge’s ‘willing 
suspension of disbelief’ was to be created in these poems through a belief in something non-
existent (the experience of supernatural agency) in the same way that such a belief exists for 
the experiencer, that is, a belief produced by the sense that those things producing the 
experience exist. The suspension of disbelief should not produce straightforward belief then – 
in the ‘there’ of the world, the ‘really real’ of the physical world – but neither should it 
preclude belief. 
What the experience of the made up produces for Coleridge is a belief which troubles the 
grounds of belief and of existence per se. A belief in the existence of something which does 
not straightforwardly exist cautions us against a direct and obvious relation between seeing 
and believing in a way that skepticism and lack of belief do not. Non-existence then is not the 
whole story when it comes to fiction. For Coleridge, belief in the existence of those things 
produced through poetic writing is the grounding of a more complex and mobile sense of the 
relation between mind and world. Coleridge’s sense of the fictional assumes existence rather 
than non-existence, making it more akin to current definitions of the virtual, but what 
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distinguishes it from current definitions of the virtual is the positioning of belief in the 
fictional precisely at the point where the existence of existence is most troubling.
Coleridge’s aims for the poems he planned to write for the Lyrical Ballads – the creation of 
belief in the existence of something that does not exist -- has had surprisingly little afterlife in 
subsequent literary critical considerations of the fictional.63 Adam Roberts’ introduction to the 
latest edition of the Biographia Literaria, from 2014, gives little space to the ‘willing 
suspension of disbelief’ and does not go beyond the accumulated orthodoxy around its 
meaning.64 However, as I have suggested, what is at stake in Coleridge’s account is precisely 
the effects of the virtual as claimed by the theorists of computer games – that representations 
are experienced as real and something to be believed in. What is different is Coleridge’s 
awareness that this challenges rather than confirms – as does the experience of the 
supernatural – our understanding of belief, lack of belief, existence and non-existence. 
Coleridge’s aims for the work of poetry are Bergson’s sense of the virtual, or Peirce’s in 1868. 
What they make possible, in contrast to the virtual of the theorists of computer games and to 
apostasy of so many novelists, is belief in the non-existent.
In Knausgaard visuality is conflated with ‘thereness’, such that existence and belief are the 
properties only of the ‘real’. Knausgaard wants to believe, and he wants us to believe. He says 
he wants to do this by a return to the ‘there’ of the world. Actually what he wants to return to 
is a Coleridgean idea of belief and existence as inherent in the fictional, but he thinks that in 
fact this is inherent not in the fictional but in contemporary understandings of the virtual. The 
problem with this is that Coleridge’s formula asserts that fiction’s power is that it produces 
belief in its existence despite the fact that it does not exist, whereas for Knausgaard belief is 
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restricted to the virtual’s assertion of its overlap with the real to the extent that it produces 
interaction dependent on ‘real’ acts of perception. Coleridge focuses on the experience of the 
reader in order to challenge and undo it; Knausgaard wants to return to a moment of the 
supposed union of perception and meaning.
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